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ABSTRACT
The Army's desire to produce agile and adaptive leaders is not a new endeavor. As early as 1999, the Army Chief of Staff recognized that the premium on tomorrow's battlefield will be the ability to quickly analyze a situation and come up with innovative solutions. The speeds at which events occur and their complexity will require leaders with agile minds who can think through a problem logically, come up with a viable course of action, and translate that concept into clear, simple language to subordinates. How is it possible that the Army is still seeking the agile leaders it requires after our most senior leadership identified their need over eight years ago? To help answer this question, this paper will describe the operational environment the agile leader must be prepared to operate within and the characteristics of an agile leader. The barriers of change, culture, and climate within the Army that impact its ability to produce agile leaders will be examined. Lastly, suggested recommendations for keeping and producing agile leaders are offered to the reader.
As early as 1999, the Army Chief of Staff recognized that the premium on tomorrow's battlefield will be the ability to quickly analyze a situation and come up with innovative solutions. The speeds at which events occur and their complexity will require leaders with agile minds who can think through a problem logically, come up with a viable course of action, and translate that concept into clear, simple language to subordinates.
How is it possible that the Army is still seeking the agile leaders it requires after our most senior leadership identified their need over eight years ago?
To help answer this question, this paper will describe the operational environment the agile leader must be prepared to operate within and the characteristics of an agile leader. The barriers of change, culture, and climate within the Army that impact its ability to produce agile leaders will be examined. Lastly, suggested recommendations for keeping and producing agile leaders are offered to the reader.
BARRIERS TO ACHIEVING MENTALLY AGILE JUNIOR LEADERS
Persistent conflict and change characterize the strategic environment. We have looked at the future and expect a future of protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors who will use violence to achieve political, religious, and other ideological ends. We will confront highly adaptive and intelligent adversaries who will exploit technology, information, and cultural differences to threaten U.S. interests. Operations in the future will be executed in complex environments and will range from peace engagement, to counterinsurgency, to major combat operations. How is it possible that the Army is still seeking the agile leaders it requires after our most senior leadership identified their need over eight years ago?
To help answer this question, this paper will examine the operational environment the agile leader must be prepared to operate within, the characteristics of an agile leader, and the barriers of change, culture, and climate within the Army and their potential impacts on the Army's ability to produce agile leaders.
Environment
The 2008 National Defense Strategy describes the strategic environment for the foreseeable future as a global struggle against violent ideological extremists committed to overturn the international state system. The adversary is an irregular force of multinational and multi-ethnic terrorist networks that seek to break the will of the American populace and its political establishment. These terrorist networks also seek to attack the will of the nations that have joined the United States to defeat them. As the United States slowly moves further away from our core traditional dominance of conventional warfare into the more likely realms of catastrophic, irregular, and disruptive styles of warfare, our leaders will require mental agility to master these different complex forms of warfare to the same degree of expertise possessed in the execution of conventional warfare.
What is an Agile Leader?
Mental agility, according to the Army's capstone leadership doctrine FM 6-22 is a flexibility of mind, a tendency to anticipate or adapt to uncertain or changing situations.
Agility assists thinking through second and third order effects when current decisions or actions are not producing the desired effects. It helps break from habitual thought patterns, to improvise when faced with conceptual impasses, and quickly apply multiple perspectives to consider new approaches or solutions. 8 Agility at all leadership levels within Army organizations are becoming more important to address situations that cannot be fully anticipated. In the current operational environment, the importance of direct leaders, noncommissioned officers and junior officer's ability to make the right decisions in stressful situations has taken on a new significance. Decisions and actions taken by direct-level leaders -the Sergeants and lieutenants carrying out the missions -can easily have major strategic level and political implications. 9 The Army senior leaders have recognized the need for mentally agile leaders able to successfully operate in an uncertain and ever changing environment. Yet the Army continues to struggle to develop these leaders within the Institutional Army's education system. It is not so much a matter of limited money, equipment, or facilities that is preventing the development of these leaders, but rather one that many large organizations face when trying to transform themselves. The barriers preventing the Institutional Army from producing agile leaders is its organizations inherent resistance to change, the Army's organizational climate, and its historically entrenched culture. and military served as a "tipping point", the moment of critical mass, which accelerated the need for significant change in the Army. 11 Despite the initial success of Operation Iraqi Freedom, our forces almost immediately faced an insurgent asymmetric enemy in a dynamic environment, for which they had not fully anticipated, nor prepared for.
Although the Operational Army has now undergone the most significant organizational change since WWII, transforming into modern modular Brigade Combat
Teams, the Institutional Army has been slow to change. General Casey recently stated, "We recognized that most of our institutional systems -personnel, education, training, healthcare, procurement, family support -were designed to support a pre-September 11th Army, and we recognized that institutional transformation would be essential to cementing the significant changes that we're making across our Army." 12 Recognizing the Institutional Army was slow to adapt, the current Chief of Staff of the Army in an attempt to get the Institutional Army transformed more rapidly has chartered a special task force to lead the effort to adapt our institutions to effectively implement the Army Force Generation. The ISTJs four preferences are found overwhelmingly in the military, 58 percent Introverted, 72 percent Sensing, 90 percent Thinking, and 80 percent Judging. 16 The human behavioral tendencies and preferences that provide the foundation of the MBTI assist in explaining why different types of people function differently. The MBTI helps to understand why people are interested in different things, prefer different kinds of work, approach issues in different ways, and sometimes find it hard to understand each other -all due to basic differences in how people take in information and make decisions about it. 17 In other words, this indicator provides insight and a useful prediction on how ISTJs prefers to approach issues and their reaction and openness to change.
To understand this group's resistance level to change, it is helpful to understand some of the tendencies of the ISTJ. People with ISTJ preferences have a strong sense of responsibility and great loyalty to the organizations. They will go to almost any trouble to complete something they see as "necessary", but balk at doing anything that does not make sense to them. Their focus is on the task or system as a whole rather than on individuals. They tend to be logical, analytical, detached, and reasonable. ISTJs are clear and steadfast in their opinions because they have arrived at them by applying logical criteria based on their experience and knowledge. They place a tremendous value on traditions and "support change" only when facts demonstrate it will bring better results. 18 The personality preferences that influence an organization's ability to implement change are those that indicate how one prefers to gather data specifically how one sees the situation, and how one orients behavior. 19 Generally people with the preference areas of S (Sensor) and J (Judger), present the greatest challenge to an organization in need of change. The "Sensor" and "Judger" preferences are overwhelmingly characterize the military, 72 percent being Sensing and 80 percent Judging. 20 The "Sensor" group tends to gather data as facts and prefers what is known to that which is unknown, the "just the facts" approach. In approaching change a common feeling amongst this group would be "if it isn't broke don't fix it", and they do not understand why some people are always seeking changes to improve everything. 21 The "Judger" group displays a highly organized structure in behavior and in thinking. When approaching change, this group does not like surprises and can become unraveled if things do not go exactly as planned. 22 The character of the SJ combination is generally structured and somewhat unimaginative with an extremely guarded approach to innovation and change. Thus, it is not surprising that the Army is slow to adopt innovative, adaptive, and agile thinkers within its ranks after decades of management that valued leaders that think, act, and behave as they do.
The Army's own organizational culture contributes to the challenge of producing and developing innovative mentally agile leaders who are able break from habitual thought patterns and consider second and third order effects. The old Army phrase "when I want your opinion, I'll give it to you", effectively summarizes the Army's long standing approach to independent thinking from its junior leaders whose success in the organization promotes being "like minded" with those superiors who directly control their fate and success. As a result the Army's senior leaders who determine which officers are selected for promotion, advanced schooling, and command assignments tend to select officers in their own image, self-perpetuating and existentially reinforce the current Army culture of "like minded" men and women.
The Army's inherent resistance to change and long held cultural norms that inhibit its ability to produce agile leaders is reinforced by the climate found within most Army organizations.
Climate
Culture and climate reinforce each other. Culture influences the characteristics of the climate by its effect on the behavior and the thought processes of the leader. The leader's behavior creates a climate that influences everyone in the organization. 28 At the organizational level, the evidence is clear that positive command climate "acts as a magnet" that attracts and holds on to spirited employees who are motivated and committed. At the individual level, the key to the climate is leadership in general and senior leadership in particular. 29 The and is forcing the Army to take unprecedented steps to halt the exodus of junior leaders.
For every quality Soldier the Army loses due to its current climate challenges, the Army is finding it more difficult to replace that Soldier with one of equal quality.
In the Army more than any other service, success is centered on its manpower.
As the Army's series of new doctrinal manuals state, agile leaders are needed to effectively operate as part of the full-spectrum force. This full-spectrum of operations will challenge our junior leaders like never before and require Soldiers and leaders of exceptional quality.
In a recent article, strategy for the long haul, an Army at the crossroads, Andrew
Krepinevich states, "here the need for Soldiers of exceptional quality risks bumping up against the limits of what the Army can reasonably expect to recruit under current conditions". 31 Despite the Army's efforts to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of Soldiers of a high quality, the trends are not encouraging. Consequently, rather than sustaining (not to mention increasing) the quantity of its force of those Soldiers who possess the mental attributes required of an agile leader, the Army finds the quality of its junior Soldiers and officers declining.
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To help fill its recruitment needs for both officers and enlisted Soldiers who choose to leave the Army in part because of its current climate, the Army is forced to recruit and promote personnel of a lower quality just to sustain required strength levels. percent are no longer on active duty. 35 An effort in the Fall of 2007 to entice over 14,000
Captains to extend their commissions fell short by roughly 1,300. 36 Compounding to the problem, the Army states it will need approximately another 6,000 Captains as it plans to grow the Army by another 65,000 Soldiers. 37 The Director of Officer Personnel Candidate School. The number of Officer Candidate School graduates has grown dramatically since the late 1990s, rising from roughly 400 a year to over 1,500 a year; more than the graduating class at West Point. 39 As the Initial Entry Soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officer quality is declining, promotion rates are increasing to meet manning requirements. Instead of the traditional promotion rates of 70 to 80 percent of eligible officers to Major, today over 98 percent of eligible Captains are promoted to Major. 40 These trends are worrisome, especially for an Army that is placing unprecedented demands on its Soldiers and calling for its institutions to produce agile leaders in the face of declining quality to operate successfully in the domain of full-spectrum operations.
The overall decline in quality and the report from the Army Training and Leader Development Panel Report, which suggests that Army practices are out of balance with its beliefs, should be alarming to the Army's senior leadership. The compromise of leader growth resulting in a dramatic increase of junior officers and first term Soldiers choosing to leaving the Army further reinforces the need for change. The command climate within a unit, primarily shaped by its leader, more than another factor influences a Soldiers decision to either stay or leave the Army.
As with culture, the climate within the Army is contributing to the challenge of producing mentally agile leaders. The current climate is influencing the choice of an unprecedented number of officers and first-term Soldiers to depart the Army, leaving the Army short of quality trained junior leaders. To fill this gap, the Army has compromised quality for quantity in a time when the environment is growing more complex and more challenges and demands are being placed on the mental attributes of the Army's junior leaders. This lack in quality is primarily being felt in the Institutional Army's cadre and instructors charged with producing the Army's mentally agile leaders. Current Army assignment polices pull the highest quality cadre and instructors out of the institutional Army to fill the higher priority Operational Army requirements, leaving a lower quality cadre and instructor within the institutional Army. This decline in quality cadre and instructors within the Institutional Army is impacting its ability to produce the mentally agile leaders the Army requires.
Recommendations
The following are recommended changes that I believe when implemented will assist the Army in producing and keeping mentally agile leaders. Getting the highest quality mid-level officers and non-commissioned officers into the Institutional Army would be a significant step to producing mentally agile leaders, but their very presence is not enough. The Army must aggressively commit to enabling the cadre, Instructors and POI developers by providing the very best instructional methods available by academic professionals that have the knowledge, skills and techniques to develop and produce mentally agile leaders. The current method of unit produced POIs, written by the same untrained and uncertified cadre that execute the training is not working for the Army.
Conclusion
While the Operational Army has undergone it's most significant changes since World War II the Institutional Army has been slow to adapt. Even though the Army's senior leadership identified the need for agile leaders as early as 1999, the Institutional Army is still struggling to produce them. The Army leaders must possess the mental agility to react quickly and appropriately to changing situations in an environment characterized as volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous while faced with an adversary that is ever-evolving. This paper highlighted some potential barriers preventing the Institutional Army from achieving the goal of producing the agile leaders and provided some recommended changes for the reader to consider. Until the Army is able to mitigate or eliminate these barriers and truly commit itself through action the Institutional Army will continue to struggle in producing and keeping the agile leaders the Army requires.
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